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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 





MARK LESLIE LARSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with automobile homicide, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 {Supp. 1977), 
a felony of the third degree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before a jury, the Honorable 
Allen B. Sorensen, District Judge, presiding. The jury 
returned a verdict of guilty. Appellant was sentenced to 
serve an indeterminate term not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. Execution of the sentence was 
suspended and appellant placed on probation on condition 
that he serve six months in the Utah County Jail, pay a 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fine of $1,000, and that he drive no motor vehicle during 
his probation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirmir. 
the judgment and sentence rendered below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 19, 1976, Detective Sergeant Owen 
Quarnberg of the Utah County Sheriff's Department observed 
a vehicle travelling south on Interstate 15 at a high rate 
of speed (T.11). Detective Quarnberg pursued the vehicle, 
and observed that it was travelling at a speed in excess 
of 100 miles per hour (T.11,12). Sergeant Quarnberg and 
Trooper Doug Staheli of the Utah Highway Patrol observed 
a collision between the suspect vehicle and a second car, 
and both officers arrived at the scene of the accident 
within a few seconds of the collision (T.12,20-21). Both 
vehicles had overturned as a result of the accident; the 
appellant was the only occupant of the suspect vehicle; 
Mr. and Mrs. Mlejnek were found inside the second car; 
and the two Mlejnek children were found a short distance 
away, having been thrown from their car by the force of 
the collision (T.13,20-21). The Mlejneks were taken to 
a hospital. 
A number of empty beer cans were found inside 
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appellant's car, and both officers observed that the 
appellant had a strong odor of alcohol and was profane 
and abusive (T.16-17,21-22). Trooper Staheli also observed 
that the appellant's face was flushed, that his eyes were 
bloodshot and watery, that he was unsteady on his feet, 
and that the appellant's speech was slurred and confused 
(T.21-22). Officer Staheli gave his opinion that the 
appellant was under the influence of alcohol and unable 
to operate a motor vehicle safely (T.23). 
The appellant was then placed in the custody of 
Trooper Don Mcrill of the Utah Highway Patrol. Trooper 
Mcrill also observed that the appellant's speech was 
slurred, and that his manner was belligerent and abusive 
(T.43-45). The appellant stated in Trooper Merill's 
presence that "I must be drunker than I thought" and made 
other statements indicating that he was intoxicated (T.45). 
Trooper Mcrill gave his opinion that the appellant was 
under the influence of alcohol and unable to operate a 
motor vehicle safely (T.45). Trooper Mcrill administered 
a breathalyzer test to the appellant, and the test 
indicated that the appellant had a blood alcohol content 
of 0.13 percent (T.55) {State's Exhibit No. 1). 
Andrew M°iejnek and his family reside in Port 
Huron, Michigan; and on June 19, 1976, they were southbound 
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on Interstate 15 enroute to a vacation in California (T.2 
At the time of the accident, they were travelling at 
approximately 50 miles per hour, and observed no other 
vehicle prior to the collision (T.30). Mrs. Sandra 
Mlejnek sustained serious injuries as a result of the 
accident; her pelvis was fractured, all of the ligaments 
in left knee were torn, her lung was inflated (sic), her 
check bone was broken, her mouth was ripped open, and she 
suffered burns on her right foot and left leg (T.37). 
At the time of the accident, Sandra Mlejnek was 
six and one-half months pregnant (T.32). Mrs. Mlejnek 
and her physician had calculated the child's probable 
conception date as January 3 or 4, 1976, and had projec~ 
a due date of October 3, 1976 (T.33). The mother had fel 
fetal movement shortly before the collision, but felt no 
fetal movement after the collision (T.34-35,37). 
Following the collision, Mrs. Mlejnek was tre~ 
by Dr. Lynn Dalton, a physician specializing in gynecol~ 
(T.67). Dr. Dalton was unable to detect any fetal heart 
tones, and determined that the child was dead (T.68). 
After waiting a period of time to allow the mother to 
recover from her other injuries, Dr. Dalton induced labor 
and caused the dead featus to be delivered (T.69). Dr. 
Dalton examined the fetus, and found that it had been 
dead for some time. The placenta was also examined, and 
-4-
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Dr. Dalton discovered a large blood clot around it (T.69). 
The witness expressed his opinion that the fetus died 
as a result of a traumatic blow (T.70). The fetus was 
found to be of average size for a 26 week old fetus, and 
Dr. Dalton approximated its weight at one and one-half 
pounds (T.72). Dr. Dalton testified that a one and 
one-half pound baby had a 25 percent statistical chance 
of survival outside of the womb, and that the chance of 
survival would go as high as 50 percent if the fetus had 
weighed two pounds, but that the chance of survival 
would have been as low of 5 percent if the fetus had 
weighed only one pound (T.71). 
At the close of the State's case, the appellant 
moved to dismiss the information on the ground that an 
unborn fetus is not "another" within the meaning of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (Supp. 1977). The court denied the 
motion (T.78). The defendant excepted to jury instruction 
Nos. 5 and 11. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AN UNBORN VIABLE FETUS IS "ANOTHER" WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF THE AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-5-207 (SUPP. 1977). 
Respondent submits that this point on appeal 
presents a single issue: was it the legislative intent 
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to include unborn but viable persons within the protectio 
of the automobile homicide statute which prohibits the 
causing of death of "another"? Respondent avers that 
this question must be answered affirmatively because such 
a legislative intent can be discerned from the totality 
of the Utah Criminal Code. Respondent further submits 
that the recognition of a viable fetus as "another" is 
the better rule of law and is in accord with the trend 
of the law as announced by a majority of American 
jurisdictions. 
A. THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO PUNISH THE 
KILLING OF A VIABLE FETUS UNDER THE GENERAL HOMICIDE 
STATUTES OF THE UTAH CRIMINAL CODE. 
Under the coP.lIT\on law, the killing of an unborn 
viable child was not murder, although it was a "great 
misprision." This common law rule was specifically 
abrogated by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (Supp. 1977): 
"Common law crimes are 
abolished and no conduct is 
a crime unless made so by this 
code, other applicable statute 
or ordinance." 
The common law rule requiring live birth as an element 
of homicide is therefore not involved in this appeal. 
The statute in issue is Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-207 (Supp. 1977), which provides: 
-6-
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"(l) Criminal homicide 
constitutes automobile homicide 
if the actor, while under the 
influence of intoxicating 
liquor, a controlled substance, 
or any drug, to a degree which 
renders the actor incapable of 
safely driving a vehicle, causes 
the death of another by operating 
a motor vehicle in a negligent 
manner." (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201 (Supp. 1977), states: 
"A person commits criminal 
homicide if he intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly, or with 
criminal negligence unlawfully 
causes the death of another." 
(Emphasis added.) 
A comparison of these sections reveals that the 
word "another" in the automobile homicide statute refers 
grammatically to another "actor" or another "person" (as 
used in Section 76-5-201). These terms are defined in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (Supp. 1977): 
"(3) 'Actor'means a person 
whose criminal responsibility 
is in issue in a criminal action. 
* * * (5) 'Person' means an 
individual, public or private 
corporation, government, partnership, 
or unincorporated association." 
{Emphasis added.) 
The word "another" therefore refers to a person or an 
individual. The Utah Criminal Code contains no further 
definitional aids, and other areas of the code must 
therefore be analyzed to determine if the legislature 
intended to include unborn persons within the ambit of 
t.he term "another." 
-7-
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Two important sources used by the Utah 
Legislature in its 1973 revision of the criminal 
code were the Model Penal Code and the Penal Code 
of New Hampshire. Martin, Utah Criminal Code Outline, 
133-134. Both of these codes limit the definition of 
"human being" or "another" so as not to include an 
unborn child as a victim of a homicide. Model Penal 
Code § 210.D, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:l(IV) (Repl. 
Vol. 1974). Respondent submits that the omission of 
such a limiting definition from the Utah Criminal Code 
is significant, and indicates a legislative intent to 
include unborn but viable fetuses within the protection 
of the homicide statutes. 
Another area of the Utah Criminal Code which 
manifests an acute legislative concern for the protection 
of fetal life is the criminal abortion section, Utah Coili 
Ann. § 76-7-302 (Supp. 1977), which provides: 
"An abortion may be performed 
in the state only under the following 
circumstances •.• (3) If performed 
when the unborn child is sufficiently 
developed to have any reasonable possibili 
of survival outside its mother's womb, 
the abortion is necessary to save the lifi 
of the pregnant woman or to prevent serio1 
and permanent damage to her health." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-307 (Supp. 1977), providE 
-8-
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"If an abortion is performed 
when the unborn child is sufficiently 
developed to have any reasonable 
possibility of survival outside of its 
mother's womb, the medical procedure 
used must be that which, in the best 
medical judgment of the physician, 
will give the unborn child the best 
chance of survival. No medical 
procedure designed to kill or injure 
an unborn child may be used unless 
necessary in the opinion of the 
women's physician, to save her life 
or prevent serious and permanent damage 
to her health." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-308 (Supp. 1977), provides: 
"Consistent with the purpose of 
saving the life of the woman or pre-
venting serious and permanent damage 
to the woman's health, the physician 
performing the abortion must use all 
of his medical skills to attempt to 
promote, preserve and maintain the life 
of any unborn child sufficiently developed 
to have any reasonable possibility of 
survival outside of the mother's womb." 
A physician who performs an abortion which is not 
authorized by law is guilty of a second degree felony, and 
a physician who fails to use all of his medical skill to 
protect the life of an unborn viable fetus during an 
authorized abortion is guilty of a third degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-314 (Supp. 1977). It would be 
inconsistent to punish a physician for causing a viable 
fetus's death during an authorized abortion, but allow 
a drunken driver to kill a similar fetus without being 
-9-
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punished. Respondent submits that the Utah criminal 
abortion statutes indicate a legislative intent to 
protect fetal life, and demonstrate that the legislature 
understands a fetus to achieve "personhood" prior to 
birth. 
The strongest indication of the legislative 
intent can be found in a joint resolution passed by the 
same legislature which originally enacted the automobile 
homicide statute. House Joint Res. 30, Laws of Utah 
(1973), provides: 
"Be it resolved by the Legislature 
of the State of Utah: 
That the Congress of the United 
States take without delay such action as 
necessary, including a Constitutional 
amendment if needed, to preserve the 
right to life of unborn children and to 
forestall a wholesale wave of lifetaking 
abortions which could result from the 
recent decision of the Supreme Court." 
There can be no doubt that the Utah Legislature conside~ 
human life to begin prior to birth. 
Respondent submits that the failure of the 
Legislature to enact a limited definition of "person," 
the provisions of the criminal abortion statutes, and th 
House Joint Res. 30 all indicate a legislative concept~ 
of "person-ness" which embraces the unborn viable child 
as well as the child which is born alive. The automobil 
homicide statute must be read in context with this 
-10-
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legislative concept. Respondent submits that a 
comparison of the automobile homicide statute with 
other relevant indicia of legislative intent leads to 
the conclusion that an unborn viable fetus is "another" 
within the meaning of the statute. 
B. THE TREND OF THE LAW IS TO RECOGNIZE 
THE KILLING OF A VIABLE FETUS AS THE KILLING OF A 
PERSON. 
Respondent submits that the holding of the 
court below that a viable fetus can be the victim of 
a homicide is in accord with the better rule of law in 
this country and recognizes the scientific fact that 
there is no significant biological difference between 
a viable infant within his mother's womb and an infant 
recently expelled from the womb by the process of birth. 
The purpose of a homicide statute is to protect human 
life. That purpose is best served when life is protected 
from the moment it has independent significance. To rely 
on live birth as the criterion for "person-ness" is to 
depend on the fortuity of the location of the life without 
the uterus and to ignore the quality of the life taken. 
The artificial nature of the live birth requirement was 
commented on in Tribe, Foreward: Toward a Model of Roles 
in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 
27-28 (1973): 
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" . . the viable fetus may be 
removed in precisely the same way 
in late pregnancy--whether surgically 
or by chemically induced labor--regard-
less of one's intentions as to its 
ultimate survival. A premature birth 
followed by the deliberate killing of 
what the doctor had removed or delivered 
would look and sound the same whether 
the intent to kill had been formed only 
after the birth was completed or had 
been present throughout the episode. To 
call the first of these acts 'infanticide' 
and the second 'abortion' or even 
'feticide' is to play with names that 
bespeak no relevant difference. 
Viability thus marks a point after 
which a secular state could properly 
conclude that permitting abortion would 
be tantamount to permitting murder, •• 
or the secular and quite practical ground 
that a state wishing to prevent the kill~ 
of infants simply has no way to distinguL 
the deliberate destruction of the latter 
from what is involved in postviability 
abortions. It is not only that such 
abortions lie close to infanticide and 
hence not far from other horrors along 
the 'slippery slope' but rather that in 
every functional sense, they occupy the 
same place on that fabled plane." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The negligent killing of a viable fetus is similarly 
functionally indistinguishable from negligently causing 
the death of an infant. Live birth is a purely artificL 
line to draw for purposes of a homicide prosecution, but 
viability is a significant distinction. As the United 
States Supreme Court conceded in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 1 
164 (1973): 
-12-
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"With respect to the State's 
important and legitimate interest 
in potential life, the 'compelling' 
point is at viability. This is so 
because the fetus then has the 
capability of meaningful life 
outside of the mother's womb. 
State regulation protective of 
fetal life after viability thus 
has both logical and biological 
justifications." 
The live birth requirement for homicide 
is not predicated on any relevant medical criteria, 
and appears to be based in part on the ignorant 
assumption that, prior to birth, a fetus is only part 
of its mother. See generally Mellman, Legal Concepts 
of Human Life: The Infanticide Doctrines, 52 Marq. L. 
Rev. 105 (1968). 
The live birth requirement is not only 
artificial and unscientific, but unworkable as well. 
This criticism of the rule was voiced in People v. Chavez, 
77 Cal.App.2d 621, 176 P.2d 92, 94 (1947): 
"There is no sound reason why 
an infant should not be considered 
a human being when born or removed 
from the body of its mother, when it 
has reached that stage of development 
where it is capable of living an 
independent life as a separate being 
and where in the natural course of 
events it will so live if given normal 
and reasonable care ••• these questions 
should be met and decided on the basis of 
whether or not a living baby with the 
natural possibility and probability of 
growth and development was being born, 
rather than on any hard and fast 
technical rule establishing a legal 
fiction that the infant being born was 
not a human being because some part of the 
process of birth had not been fully 
completed." 
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Thus, the Court in Chavez held that a complete 
live birth need not be shown for a homicide prosecution, 
and only required a showing of viability during the birth 
process. This reasoning was approved and followed in 
Singleton v. State, 35 So.2d 375 (Ala. App. 1948). 
The common law rule requiring a live birth for 
a homicide prosecution, although well-established, is 
neither reasonable, scientific nor practical. 
Respondent urges this Court to adopt as its 
rule of decision in this case the holding of the majori~ 
of American courts as to the law of wrongful death for 
unborn viable fetuses. Appellant has recognized the 
appropriateness of looking to the law of wrongful death 
in deciding the issue presented by this point on appeal 
by reliance on Kihner v. Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 529 
P.2d 706 (1975), and Justiss v. Atchison, 139 Cal.Rptr. 
565 P.2d 122 (1977) (Brief of Appellant, page 7). Both 
of these cases hold that a parent cannot recover under a 
wrongful death statute for a defendant's negligence 
causing a stillbirth. These cases represent the distinct 
minority position in American law. 
Under the common law, an infant could not 
recover in tort for prenatal injuries on the ground that 
a fetus en ventre sa mere was only a part of his mother. 
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The rule was announced as part of American jurisprudence 
by Justice Holmes in Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 
14, 52 Am.Rep. 242 (1884). This decision was followed by 
other jurisdictions, and not questioned until Allaire v. 
St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900), 
Justice Boggs, in dissent, criticized the rule as 
unscientific and unsound. No case allowed recovery until 
1946, when " ••• a rapid series of cases, many of them 
expressly overruling prior holdings, have brought about 
what was up till that time the most spectacular abrupt 
reversal of a well settled rule in the whole history of the 
law of torts." Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts 336 
(4th ed. 1971). Professor Prosser has observed, " ••• it 
is now apparently literally true that there is no authority 
left still supporting the older rule {that an infant cannot 
recover for prenatal injuries)," id. at 337, and that "all 
writers who have discussed the problem have joined in 
maintaining that the unborn child in the path of an auto-
mobile is as much a person in the street as the mother. 
Id. at 336. Although the right of an infant to recover in 
tort for prenatal injuries is no longer questioned, there 
is a split of authority as to whether a parent may recover in 
wrongful death for the stillbirth of her/his child. In 
Justiss, supra at 565 P.2d 125, nn. 4,5, the court indicated 
that 25 jurisdictions now allow recovery, while only 12 deny 
-15-
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recovery. The highest courts of two states have recent~ 
reversed prior holdings and have allowed recovery in wror 
ful death for negligently causing a stillbirth. Mone v, 
Greyhound Lines, 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass 1975), overruling 
Leccesse v. McDonough, 279 N.E.2d 339 (1972); Evans v. 
Olsen, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976), overruling Padillmv v. 
Elrod, 424 P.2d 16 (1967). The holdings in these cases 
offer a useful analogy to the issue presented by this 
point on appeal. An action for wrongful death, like the 
definition of automobile homicide in Utah, is a statutor 
creation and independent of the common law. The issue 
resolved by these cases is whether the legislatures 
intended to include unborn viable fetuses within the ten 
"person" or "minor children" in wrongful death statutes. 
A majority of American jurisdictions have concluded that 
unborn persons are indeed "persons" within the meaning~ 
a relevant statute, and have imposed liability for 
negligently causing the "person's" death. The aptness 
of the analogy of the wrongful death statutes is made ev1 
more clear by the fact that, in some jurisdictions, wron1 
death statutes are not compensatory but penal with the 
amount of damages depending entirely on the defendant's 
culpability and not upon the plaintiff's loss. The 
Alabama Supreme Court, for example, has described its 
wrongful death statute as entirely penal and quasi-crimD 
-16-
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and has not hesitated to impose liability for causing the 
death of an unborn viable fetus. Eich v. Town of Gulf 
Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So.2d 354, 357 (1974). 
The cases advance a number of reasons for 
including unborn viable fetuses within the coverage of 
the wrongful death statutes. First is a conclusion that 
the legislatures intended the terms "person" or "minor 
child" to include an unborn fetus. See Libbee v. Permanente 
Clinic, 518 P.2d 636, 639, reh. denied 520 P.2d 361 (Ore. 
1974). Another reason for allowing recovery is that a 
denial of recovery for a stillborn child is logically 
inconsistent with allowing recovery for other prenatal 
injuries. Stidham v. Ashmore, 11 Ohio App.2d 383, 167 
N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959). A live birth requirement would 
produce other inconsistencies. As was pointed out in 
Todd v. Sandidge Construction Co., 341 F.2d 75, 77 (4th 
Cir. 1964), the live birth rule means that the graver 
the harm influcted to a fetus, the greater the wrongdoer's 
chance of immunity. The rationale of all the decisions 
was well summarized by the court in Chrisafogeogis v. 
Brandenburg, 55 Ill.2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88, 91 (1973): 
"To hold, as a matter of law 
that no viable fetus has any 
separate existence which the 
law will recognize is for the 
law to deny a simple and easily 
demonstrable fact." 
-17-
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In short, the rule allowing recovery in tort for prenab 
death is supported by reason, science and the weight of 
authority. 
This Court has not yet ruled on the question ~ 
whether recovery is permitted under Utah's Wrongful Deat: 
Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 (1953), for the death 1 
an unborn child. In Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 534, 132 P.21 
114 (1942), this Court held that damages could not be 
awarded for the loss of a child which was not viable. 
In Nelson v. Patterson, 542 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975), this 
Court expressly reserved judgment on the issue. Two 
justices dissented and stated: 
"Our case of Webb v. Snow is not 
applicable for two reasons: First, the 
operative facts are completely distin-
guishable and we would not do an 
injustice to stare decisis for the 
reason that the concept advanced by 
that case is no longer a part of the 
weight of authority in this country. 
Additionally, I see no moral, biological 
or legal rationale for sustaining an 
outmoded, dry rule laced with the 
fiction of a bygone era." 542 P.2d at 
1079. 
A conclusion that an unborn viable fetus is a 
"person" who can be the victim of a wrongful death compe 
the conclusion that an unborn viable fetus is a "person' 
who can be the victim of a homicide. See The Unborn chl 
Consistency in the Law, 2 Suffolk L. Rev. 228, 242-243 
(1968). 
-18-
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Respondent submits that the weight of authority 
and the better reasoned cases hold that a fetus is a person 
for the purposes of wrongful death. These authorities 
rejected a well-established but outmoded tort rule requiring 
live birth to reach this result. Respondent submits that 
the live birth requirement for homicide is outmoded for 
substantially the same reasons. Respondent urges this 
Court to recognize the trend of the law in this area and 
to reject the obsolete live birth definition of "person." 
Appellant's conviction should be affirmed. 
C. THE AUTHORITY CITED BY APPELLANT IS NOT 
APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
Appellant has cited the following cases in 
support of his contention that proof of a live birth is 
required for a homicide conviction: Commonwealth v. Edelin, 
359 N.E.2d 4 (Mass. 1976); Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 
619, 87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617 (1970); State v. 
Dickenson, 28 Ohio. St. 2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971); 
State v. Gyles, 303 So.2d 799 (La. 1975). Respondent 
submits that these authorities are not applicable to 
the case at bar. Edelin is not applicable because the 
court in that caae did not construe the meaning of any 
term in a statutory definition of homicide. In Massachusetts, 
there is no statutory definition of manslaughter (the crime 
charged in that case) and the court's decision was controlled 
by the common law which requires a live birth. The common 
-19-
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law is not involved in this appeal. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-105 (Supp. 1977). 
The three remaining cases are distinguishable 
because the courts in those cases were declaring the 
intents of different legislatures as determined by an 
examination of statutes with distinct legislative 
histories. The cases of Keeler v. Superior Court and 
State v. Dickenson are distinguishable on additional 
grounds. As was pointed out in Point IB above, a rule 
in tort allowing recovery for prental death impels the 
conclusion that an unborn viable fetus can be the victh 
of a homicide. In State v. Dickenson, the prosecution 
argued that inasmuch as an intermediate appellate court 
in Ohio had recognized prenatal wrongful death, the Ohio 
Supreme Court should recognize prenatal homicide. The 
Supreme Court stated that it did not feel bound by the 
lower court decision, and went on to state: 
" ••• the definition of a 
word in a civil statute does not 
necessarily import the same 
meaning to the same word in inter-
preting a criminal statute. The 
result may be desireable, but 
criminal statutes unlike civil 
statutes, must be strictly 
construed against the state." 
275 N.E.2d at 602. 
In short, the court sought to justify its narr 
construction of the word "person" and its inconsistent 
-20-
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treatment of the fetus in tort and criminal law on the 
basis of a rule of strict construction. This rationale 
cannot apply in this jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-106 (Supp. 1977), states: 
"The rule that a penal 
statute is to be strictly 
construed shall not apply to 
this code, any of its provisions, 
or any offense defined by the laws 
of this state. All provisions of 
this code and offenses defined by 
the laws of this state shall be 
construed according to the 
fair import of their terms, to 
promote justice and to effect the 
objects of the law and general 
purposes (of the criminal code)." 
Contrary to the Dickenson court, this Court must construe 
the word "another" in the automobile homicide statute 
according its fair import, and not give it a technical 
common law meaning. 
In Keeler v •. Superior Court, supra, the central 
premise is that the California Legislature did not intend 
to include a viable fetus within the meaning of the term 
"human being." That premise is demonstrably in error, 
because the California Legislature, in response to the 
Keeler decision, amended its statutory definition of murder 
to read, "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being or 
a fetus with malice aforethought." West's Cal. Pen. Code 
Ann. § 187 (a) (Pocket Part). The Keeler decision was, in 
effect, overruled by the legislature. 
-21-
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Justice Burke's dissent in Keeler is thought~ 
and well written and bears directly on the issue prese~ 
by this appeal. Justice Burke notes that although the 
common law required a live birth to establish a homicide 
the killing of a viable unborn fetus was still considere 
a serious crime under the common law. 470 P.2d at 631, 
Justice Burke also argued that the legal concept of 
"human being" should change with the advance of medical 
science, and proposed the following analogy. At common 
law, a person could not be convicted of the murder of 
a person whose heart had ceased to beat, because such a 
person would be considered already dead, given the state 
of medical science. In modern times, a person whose hea 
had ceased to beat might, under proper circumstances, be 
revived by modern medical techniques. Such a person cou 
no longer be considered dead, and therefore could be the 
victim of a homicide. Similarly, the law should keep 
stride with the advances in medicine which can protect 
the life of the fetus and recognize life as beginning 
prior to birth. 470 P.2d at 631. 
Respondent submits that the authority cited 
by appellant is not persuasive, and asks that his convic 
tion be affirmed. 
··22-
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POINT II 
INCLUDING A VIABLE FETUS WITHIN THE MEANING 
OF "ANOTHER" IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-207 (SUPP. 1977), 
DOES NOT DEPRIVE APPELLANT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
Appellant contends that the lower court's 
ruling that a viable fetus is "another" within the 
meaning of the automobile homicide statute was an 
"unforseeable judicial enlargement" of a criminal 
statute, and that the application of the statute to 
him would be ex post facto and a denial of due process. 
This argument has two weaknesses. First, the lower 
court's construction of the statute was not an "enlarge-
ment" of the statute and was not "unforseeable." 
Respondent submits that the ruling below was in harmony 
with the legislative intent and cannot be viewed as 
an expansion of the statute's coverage (see Point IA, 
supra). Respondent further submits that, inasmuch as 
a majority of American jurisdictions consider a fetus 
to be a person, the lower court's construction of the 
term "another" is neither unforseeable, unusual nor 
unfair to the appellant (see Point IB, supra). 
The second flaw in appellant's argument is 
that, assuming the lower court's ruling was an unforseeable 
enlargement of the statute, it did not affect the portion 
of the statute which defines criminal conduct. Certain 
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kinds of criminal conduct are punished differently 
depending upon the result produced by the conduct, 
rather than on differences in the criminal conduct 
itself. For examplP., if A and B independently fired 
weapons at X with the intent to kill X, but only 
A's aim was true, A would be guilty of murder, while 
B could only be guilty of a lesser offense (i.e., 
attempted murder, or assault). In this case, there 
is no dispute over the definition of appellant's 
criminal conduct (operating a motor vehicle in a 
negligent fashion while intoxicated) but over the 
definition of the culpable result (causing the death 
of "another"). Appellant made no attempt to conform 
his conduct to the known and unmistakable requirements 
of law, and he was not " • required at peril of life, 
liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of 
penal statutes." Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 
347, 351 (1964). It is a fiction to suggest that if 
appellant had known that the automobile homicide statute 
would punish the killing of unborn persons he would not 
have engaged in the conduct for which he was convicted. 
Compare Keeler v. Superior Court at 470 P.2d 633 (Burke, 
J. dissenting): 
-24-
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"Aside from the absurdity 
of the underlying premise that 
defendant consulted Coke, Blackstone 
or Hale before kicking [the unborn 
victim] to death, it is clear that 
defendant had adequate notice that 
his act could constitute homicide. 
Due process only precludes prosecu-
tion under a new statute insufficiently 
explicit regarding the specific conduct 
proscribed, or under a pre-existing 
statute 'by means of an unforseeable 
enlargement thereof.'" 
Respondent submits that appellant received the 
"fair warning" required by due process and that his 
conviction should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF 
HIS CONVICTION ON THE GROUNDS OF INSUFFICIENCY OF 
EVIDENCE AS TO THE VIABILITY OF THE VICTIM. 
A. APPELLANT HAS NOT PROPERLY PRESERVED THIS 
POINT FOR APPEAL. 
At the conclusion of the State's case, the 
appellant moved for a dismissal on the grounds that a 
viable fetus is not "another" within the meaning of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (Supp. 1977) (T.74). The 
record on appeal does not indicate that appellant ever 
directed the lower court's attention to the claimed 
insufficiency of evidence of viability by way of a 
motion to dismiss, for a directed verdict, a new trial, 
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or an arrest of judgment. There is consequently no 
ruling or order below which appellant can claim 
erroneous. Principles of appellate review prevent this 
Court from hearing a claim of error for the first time 
on appeal. State v. Carter, 27 Utah 2d 416, 497 P.2d ~ 
(1972). Respondent submits that appellant has not 
properly preserved this point for appeal. 
B. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH 
THE JURY COULD FIND THAT THE VICTIM WAS A VIABLE FETUS. 
The fundamental rule governing a claim of 
insufficient evidence on appeal is that the evidence a~ 
all inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdic: 
State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977). In this case, 
the jury heard the testimony of a medical expert that ti 
victim was of average size for a fetus in the 26th wecl 
of gestation and that its weight was approximately one 
and one half pounds. Viability occurs at different tim1 
in differentpregnancies, but usually occurs between the 
24th and 28th week. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (19' 
Some medical authorities feel that viability occurs ew 
earlier, and viability has been defined to mean "capabi 
of living; the state of being viable; usually connotes 
fetus that has reached 500 grams in weight (about 1.1 
pounds) and 20 gestational weeks." Stedmen's Medical 
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Dictionary 1388 (22nd ed. 1972), as quoted in Viability 
and Abortion, 64 Ky. L. J. 146, 148 n. 14 (1975). The 
concept of viability does not require that the fetus have 
a better than even chance of survival. Rather, it 
suggests that stage of development where the fetus has 
a reasonable chance of survival. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-7-302 (3) (Supp. 1977). Respondent submits that there 
was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the 
victim was viable, and appellant's conviction should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that appellant has been 
convicted under a correct interpretation of the automobile 
homicide statute which includes a viable fetus as "another," 
that appellant's right to due process of law has not been 
violated, and that appellant is not entitled to a reversal 
because of insufficiency of evidence. Appellant's 
conviction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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